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This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital
ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based
on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a
strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios a®ect the ability
of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital
requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can
borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
JEL: G21, G28




In 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a proposal for a new capital
adequacy agreement (Basel II), which shall displace the existing agreement presumably
by 2006. Basically, either regulation stipulates that banks maintain a minimum capital
adequacy ratio of 8 percent of their standardized risk weighted assets to enhance the sta-
bility and soundness of the banking industry. Unlike the existing regulation, however, the
new Basel accord allows for a stricter orientation of capital to the speci¯c risks associated
with a bank's assets.
While improving risk weighting, the Basel Committee is anxious to keep the capital re-
quirement associated with an average risky portfolio more or less unchanged. This concern
has been caused partly by observations that capital-to-asset ratios increased considerably
in the aftermath of the launch of the ¯rst Basel accord. Figure 1 provides such evidence for
an unbalanced sample of 16 European banks. On average, both tier 1 (core capital) and
tier 1 through 3 (total capital) capital-to-asset ratios have been increasing. Such evidence
is also presented in Jackson (1999) for a number of G-10 banks; the average capital-to-
asset ratio of major banks in G-10 countries rose from 9.3 % in 1988 to 11.2 % in 1996.
In a more recent study, the Banking Supervision Committee of the European System of
Central Banks assesses the capital cushion of banks in the EU to more than 50 percent
on average in 2002 while the risk-weighted asset share of banks with a total regulatory
capital ratio below 9% was only 3.5% of all institutions (European Central Bank, 2003).1
Similar results are reported for Switzerland (Rime, 2001), Spain (Ayuso, P¶ erez, Saurina,
2004) and the U.S. (Peura, Jakivuolle, 2004)).
At ¯rst sight, one possible reason for these observations might be the exceptional rise in
the stock markets during the period under consideration. At this time, banks were clearly
in a comfortable position to raise new funds through issues of shares and the rise in the
market also indicates that banks were able to reinvest earnings considerably.
Another line of arguments to rationalize the observations stems from portfolio management
considerations taking into account costs of approaching or falling below the minimum
requirement. In general, banks trade o® these costs with those associated with raising
capital up-front or with recapitalization when the requirement is violated. As a result,
banks may choose to exceed the minimum capital-to-asset ratio. Fur¯ne (2000), e.g.,
argues that these costs might come in form of intensi¯ed supervisory review, a weakened
reputation or immediacy of the need to restore the capital position either by cutting
lending or trying to obtain new external capital. Jokivuolle and Kauko (2001) show that
even under the new Basel Accord risk averse banks may want to further increase the
1The capital cushion is de¯ned as the percentage actual capital in excess of the minimum requirement.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
core 5,4 5,3 6,3 5,9 7,8 8,1 9,6
total 10,7 10,7 10,5 11,3 10,4 10,1 9,9 10,6 11,5 12 13,1 12,1 12,6
core 5,7 6 6,6 6 5,5 6
total 9,5 11,2 10,2 9,7 9,4 11 11,7
core 5,4 6 6,4 6,6 6 5,6
total 9,5 9,5
core 5,9 6,3 6,3 6,5 6,2 7,5
total 9,5 8,7
core 5,91 6,85 6,74 6,51 7,21 6,96 6,94 7,2 7,2 7,8 9,3
total 9,88 11,2 11 10,8 10,9 10,7 10,5 10,9 10,4 10,2 11,7
core 5,6 5,7 5,5 5,4 5,9 6,4 7,1 7,5 7,3 8,1
total
core 7,6 7,3 8,5 8,2
total 12,2 11,8 13,5 13
core 4,6 5 5 5,5 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,5 7,6 8,9 8,4 8,1
total 9 9,1 9,1 9,3 9,2 10,2 11,1 11,1 11,9 12,5 11,5 11,1
core 7,6 6,85 7,74 9,13
total 6,55 8,52 11 11,6
core 7,45 7,05 6,76 6,01 6,8
total 10,3 9,93 9,99 9,33 11,1
core 7,4 8,7
total 12,7 15,2
core 5,8 6 6,4
total
core 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,4 6,8 7 6,9 8,2
total 8,6 8,7 9,4 10,4 10,7 11 10,1 11,2
core 10,6 10,4 10,3 10 10,3 9,9 10,3
total 11,3 11,1 11,1 10,5 10,6 10,2 10,5
core 7,6 8,2 7,7 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,6 10,8 8,8
total 10,2 10,5 10,4 10,8 11 10,5 10,2 11,8 9
core 9 8,5 8,9 8,5 8,4
























Figure 1: Capital-to-asset ratios for 16 European banks
Source: Annual Reports of respective banks (several volumes).
capital cushion above the minimum level. They suggest that increased risk-sensitivity of
the capital charge would increase the likelihood that, ceteris paribus, an institution hits
the 8 per cent minimum ratio for some time in the future as ratings of their borrowers,
either internal or external, °uctuate unexpectedly.2
Most of these explanations of holding capital-to-asset ratios in excess of those required by
regulation su®er from a common shortcoming: they do not account for the functions banks
perform in an environment of imperfect ¯nancial markets characterized by informational
lacks and enforcement problems in ¯nancial contracting.
This paper aims to contribute overcoming this shortcoming. It provides a rationale (based
on a functional approach to banking) for holding a capital cushion, e.g. capital in excess
of regulatory requirements. In addition, it shows why disintermediation may appear as a
consequence of it. The starting point of our analysis is the incomplete contracts approach
to banking o®ered by Diamond and Rajan (2001). In their setting depository institutions
(banks) exist as liquidity creators in a world of incomplete ¯nancial contracts. They
assume that a banker acts as a relationship lender who is endowed with speci¯c skills.
2For related portfolio approaches see also Estrella (2004) and Peura and Keppo (2003).
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These skills allow her to enhance the ability of a borrower to commit himself to ful¯ll
loan obligations even if his ultimate lenders are in need of funds at short notice. The
banker can do so because she knows at best how to extract payments from the project's
assets without employing the borrower's speci¯c skills. Therefore, a borrower's threat to
withdraw his speci¯c knowledge from the project once the investment is placed looses bite
and he can credibly commit to pay out a larger share of his return to his lender if he is
bound to a banker.
On the other hand, by construction of the demand deposit contract, a banker can credibly
commit herself not to hold up her ¯nanciers since any attempt to hold up depositors results
in a bank run. Owing to this special characteristic of a deposit contract, deposits strictly
dominate bank capital as long as project returns are certain. However, Diamond and Rajan
(2000) argue that a mixed capital structure may emerge if project returns are stochastic.
There, bank capital not only reduces the ability of a banker to commit her speci¯c skills but
serves also as a bu®er against shocks to asset values. In their analysis the optimum capital-
to-asset ratio therefore depends on a tradeo® between a bank's solvency and credibility.
Moreover, in a multi-period version of their model Diamond and Rajan show that a
banker's ability to extract payments from her borrowers depends non-monotonically on
her capital structure.
Nevertheless, Diamond and Rajan were not able to explain why banks tend to exceed
regulatory capital requirements once they are introduced. The reason is that a banker
who is obliged to ful¯ll a capital-to-asset ratio that is higher than the optimal ratio when
regulation is absent can extract more rents, which in turn always reduces the amount she
can pledge to her ¯nanciers.
The main point of this paper is that the amount a banker can pledge to ultimate ¯nanciers
may also depend on her capital structure in a nonmonotonic way. We will show that this
result arises when (1) renegotiations are risky since they may break down, and (2) the
banker behaves risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In our setting, capital
does not serve as a bu®er against shocks to project returns but as a strategic tool for
renegotiations with borrowers. When the capital-to-asset ratio is exceeding some critical
value, the banker can share her risk of a renegotiation breakdown with her shareholders to
an increasing degree, which makes her less reluctant to assume the risk of a renegotiation
breakdown. Hence, she is able to extract even higher payments from her borrower. On
the other hand, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000), an increasing capital-to-asset ratio also
improves her ability to extract rents at the expense of equity claimants. Hence, whether
payments, which can credibly be pledged to ultimate ¯nanciers, are increasing or not
depends on a tradeo® between enhancing the bankers ability to extract payments from
borrowers and capturing rents.
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The argument that the capital structure can be used strategically for negotiations with a
third party is not novel. For example, Perotti and Spier (1993) suggest that an entrepren-
eur makes use of senior debt claims as a bargaining tool to extort his contracting party.
However, Perotti and Spier focus on the strategic relationship between shareholders and
labor unions and show how an entrepreneur can use debt-for-equity exchanges to extract
wage concessions from his employees; they do not apply this idea to a banker whose eco-
nomically valuable function is liquidity creation. Moreover, they argue by means of the
Nash bargaining solution to renegotiations assuming that utility over the set of possible
bargaining outcomes is convex, which leaves open why the players' attitudes towards risk
may matter for renegotiations. In this paper, instead, we utilize a non-cooperative game
structure with stochastic bargaining costs to provide a microeconomic rationale for that
risk aversion may matter.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the determinants of a bank's capital
structure and asks how the amount of funds the bank can raise from her ¯nanciers depends
on her capital structure. Section 3 focuses on the consequences of binding minimum capital
adequacy ratios for bank lending. Section 4 discusses some policy implications. Section 5
summarizes the results.
2 Determinants of a Bank's Capital Structure
2.1 Financial Contracts with the Risk of Renegotiation Break Down
In a ¯rst step, we show in a non-cooperative game setting how, in general, the bargain-
ing solution of renegotiations depends on the parties' attitudes towards risk if there is a
possibility that renegotiations may break down. Following Hart and Moore (1994) and
Hart (1995) we consider a ¯nancial relationship between an entrepreneur and a lender
(not necessarily a bank yet). The entrepreneur runs a ¯rm and possesses a project idea
but is endowed with no own funds. His external ¯nancial needs are, thus, identical with
the size I of the investment project.3
The project lasts for one period or two dates T = 0;1 respectively. The project requires
an initial investment of I at T = 0 and yields a non-veri¯able cash °ow of Y > I at T = 1
if the entrepreneur contributes his speci¯c skills. The physical assets created in the course
of the initial investment may also have a value without the entrepreneur's speci¯c skills.
This second best alternative use is referred to as liquidation and has a veri¯able return of
L 2 (0;I) at T = 1.
As in Hart and Moore (1994), Hart (1995) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) we
assume that the entrepreneur cannot commit to contributing his speci¯c skills to the
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Figure 2: The renegotiation game in extensive form
project in the remote future but only for a short period of time. Hence, once the investment
is placed, the entrepreneur might initiate renegotiations shortly before the project matures
in order to beat down loan repayments by threatening to withdraw his speci¯c skills.
Only if both parties reach an agreement as a result of renegotiations the entrepreneur will
actually contribute his speci¯c skills and the project turns out to be successful.
The renegotiation game in extensive form is assumed to have the following general struc-
ture (Rubinstein, 1982): If the entrepreneur refuses to ful¯l his originally given debt oblig-
ation H ¸ I, both parties meet to start a ¯rst bargaining round. In this ¯rst round, the
entrepreneur o®ers an alternative repayment P which can be either accepted or rejected by
the lender. If the latter rejects P she makes a countero®er R in the second round. When
the entrepreneur rejects this countero®er R, an independent arbitrator ¯xes a repayment
X 2 (L;Y ), which is known to both parties at the beginning of renegotiations.
However, in extension to this general structure of the Rubinstein game, renegotiations may
break down after each bargaining round with given probabilities (¯gure2). To give some
intuition for this assumption, suppose that, if the lender rejects the ¯rst o®er P made
by the entrepreneur, she applies for an insolvency proceeding at a court of justice. Since
project returns Y are non-veri¯able by courts at this early stage of the hearing, the court
may decide to dissmiss this application with probability (1 ¡ p) because it expects that
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bankruptcy assets lack to cover the costs of the legal procedure. In this case, the lender
seizes the real assets and liquidates. On the other hand, with probability p 2 (0;1), the
court opens the insolvency proceeding and allows the lender to make a countero®er R.
In this second round the entrepreneur decides whether or not to accept R. While deciding
on accepting R the entrepreneur has to take into account that, with probability q 2 (0;1),
the court has learned that the project's conjectural value is ¹ Y 2 (L;Y ). Maybe, this
conjectural value ¹ Y is Y net of legal charges: Suppose the judge comes to know the true
value Y of the project with probability q; having subtracted the court costs a total of ¹ Y
remains to be shared between the lender and the entrepreneur. Hence, with probability
q the judge will convict the entrepreneur to pay out an amount X to the lender, which





. On the other hand, with probability (1 ¡ q), the court has no additional
valuable information on the project`s value and, hence, allows the lender to liquidate the
entrepreneur`s assets.
By backward induction, the entrepreneur accepts the lender's countero®er R in round 2 if
U(Y ¡ R) ¸ qU(Y ¡ X) + (1 ¡ q)U(0); (1)
where U denotes the entrepreneur's von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index. Thus, the
lender will o®er R such that the entrepreneur is just indi®erent to accept, i.e. R equals
the certainty equivalent of a lottery
¡2 =
(
Y ¡ X with probability q
0 with probability 1 ¡ q









In the ¯rst bargaining round the lender accepts the entrepreneur's original o®er P if
V (P) ¸ pV (R) + (1 ¡ p)V (L)
where V denotes the lender's von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index. Accordingly, the
entrepreneur sets P equal to the lender's certainty equivalent of a lottery
¡1 =
(
R with probability p
L with probability 1 ¡ p
:
It follows P 2 (L;Y ) irrespectively whether H > ¹ Y or not.
Consequently, whenever P < H the entrepreneur will certainly refuse to meet his re-
payment obligation at T = 1 and the lender is, thus, not willing to conclude a ¯nancial
contract at T = 0 because loan repayments do not cover the opportunity costs of the
provided funds.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium solution P depends on the liquidation value L, the
project's cash °ow Y and its veri¯able part ¹ Y , and the probabilities p and q, as well as on
the respective attitudes towards risk of both parties: On the one hand, a more risk averse
entrepreneur both accepts a higher payment R in the second round and o®ers a higher
payment P in the ¯rst round than a less risk averse entrepreneur. On the other hand, the
repayment the lender is just willing to accept in the ¯rst round will be smaller the more
risk averse she behaves.
So far, we have considered the renegotiation process between the entrepreneur and a lender,
given that there is a risk of breakdown in renegotiations. Next we analyze what speci¯c
role demand deposits o®ered by a bank play during renegotiations.
2.2 Bank Finance by Demandable Deposits
Assume that liquidation of the physical assets requires speci¯c liquidation skills. Acquir-
ing these skills is a time and e®ort consuming business so that the lender bears some
(non-monetary) disutility. To economize on these costs it is optimal to mandate a single
banker to acquire these liquidation skills, who acts on behalf of all ¯nanciers in ¯nancial
contracting with the entrepreneur. Without loss of generality, these costs are normalized
to zero.
The banker is assumed to possess no own ¯nancial wealth. Instead, to grant a loan to
the entrepreneur, she has to raise money from ¯nanciers. However, this generates an
overlapping hold-up problem since not only the entrepreneur may refuse to meet his loan
obligations but the banker may also want to renegotiate her obligations owed to ¯nanciers.
She can do so because, while accompanying the project from its very ¯rst stage, she is the
only one who develops speci¯c skills in identifying how to bring out the best liquidation
value of the project, whereas anyone else yields much lower liquidation proceeds because
of lacking these skills. Hence, the banker may threaten not to utilize her skills unless
obligations are renegotiated.
If, however, the banker takes money from ¯nanciers by means of a deposit contract, the
hold-up problem between the banker and the ¯nanciers vanishes. As mentioned in the
introduction and shown by Diamond and Rajan (2001) the deposit contract creates a
collective action problem among depositors such that any attempt of the banker to rene-
gotiate deposits results in a bank run and total disintermediation. This disintermediation
disables the banker to cover her initial costs of acquiring liquidation skills. Thus, she is
not inclined to renegotiate demandable deposits unless it is absolutely necessary.
By issuing demandable deposits, the banker is able to attract funds from depositors needed
for lending to the entrepreneur if the maximum pledgeable repayments from the entrepren-
eur cover the opportunity costs of funds. In the case of our model setting, the face value
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of deposits D equals external ¯nancial needs I of the entrepreneur and the intermediated
¯nancial arrangement is feasible if P ¸ I.
2.3 Mixed Bank Finance
So far, we have assumed that the bank completely ¯nances her assets by demand deposits.
Now, we consider the case when the banker uses a mixed capital structure and chooses
a capital-to-asset ratio k, i.e. the share of equity E in total funds raised from ¯nanciers.
To simplify matters, we assume that the banker and equity shareholders equally share the
loan repayments from the entrepreneur net of deposits owed to depositors.4 Then, the
capital ratio is given by
k =
1
2 (P ¡ D)
1






















































Lemma 1 If the banker exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the maximum
pledgeable loan repayment P is decreasing in k for low k but increasing in k for high k.
Proof.






¸ 0, which holds true
































4Note that renegotiations with shareholders do not impose a stochastic bargaining process as renegoti-
ations with borrowers do. The reason is that a banker holds a ¯xed claim on the cash°ow of the borrower
whereas the claim of shareholders on a bank is not ¯xed. In general, a default on a ¯xed claim causes
insolvency, while bargaining between shareholders and the executive board of a bank takes place in the
course of a shareholders meeting (where refusing to pay out shareholders does not cause a default or any
legal action per se).
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with probability 1 ¡ p
;
Without loss of generality this lottery can be transformed to
^ ¡1 =
½ ^ W1 := W + 1
2(1 ¡ p)(R ¡ L) with probability p
^ W2 := W + 1
2p(L ¡ R) with probability 1 ¡ p
;
where W := 1
2
h




denotes the common expected value of the
lotteries ~ ¡1 and ^ ¡1. If the utility function V exhibits decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion, then the certainty equivalent of the lottery ^ ¡1, given by the amount C at which
V (C) = pV ( ^ W1) + (1 ¡ p)V ( ^ W2)
holds true, is such that the di®erence between the expected value W of the lotterie and
the corresponding certainty equivalent C is decreasing in W (Mas-Colell; Whinston;
Green, 1995, p. 193; also see Pratt, 1964). Since W itself is an increasing function




















which, for a given P, is increasing in k by P=(1 + k)
2. Hence, maximum pledgeable
loan repayments P are increasing in the capital ratio k.





1 ¡ ^ k














= 0. The lottery the
banker faces now is given by
¹ ¡1 =
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¹ W2 := 0 with probability 1 ¡ p
:
Without loss of generality, set V (0) = 0. The maximum pledgeable loan repayment





























































where the denominator is strictly positive. Hence, dP=dk < 0 for all concave utility
































The interpretation of lemma 1, part 1, is apparent: Because the banker can renegotiate
with shareholders, loan repayments net of deposits are divided between them. As a con-
sequence, if renegotiations with the borrower fail, the banker can share the risk of this
renegotiations breakdown with shareholders. If, on the other hand, renegotiations suc-
ceed, the loan repayments collected by the banker (net of deposit repayments) are divided
equally between shareholders and the banker. Hence, the banker's risk burdens are less
meaningful for a higher capital ratio if she exhibits decreasing attitudes towards risk. This,
in turn, strengthens her bargaining position vis-µ a-vis borrowers.
This implies that the risk premium de¯ned as W ¡C is decreasing in k. This risk premium
can be approximated by ¡
V 00( ~ X)
V 0( ~ X)
~ ¾2
2 , where ~ ¾2 = 1
4fp(1 ¡ p)2 + p2(1 ¡ p)(R ¡ L)2g is the
variance of the lotteries ~ ¡1 and ^ ¡1. Hence, the response of the maximum pledgeable loan
repayments P to a variation in k is the stronger
² the more sensitively the bank`s absolute risk aversion reacts to changes in W,
² the higher the risk associated with debt renegotiations is, i.e. the larger the veri¯able
part of project returns ¹ Y is.
Part 2 of lemma 1 deals with the situation that the capital-to-asset ratio k is low such that
the banker gets nothing if renegotiations break down (because everything she collects from
liquidation is forwarded to depositors). Then, the maximum pledgeable loan repayments
are a decreasing function of k if the banker behaves risk avers. The reason for this is that
a variation in k does not a®ect the banker`s net income position in case of a renegotiations
breakdown but only if renegotiations succeed. But a risk averse banker is less willing to
accept a higher risk of a renegotiation breakdown, i.e. the certainty equivalent of the
lottery does not increase proportionally and therefore P decreases. To put it the other
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way round, maximum pledgable loan repayments increase if the capital ratio decreases
and reach a local maximum at k = 0, i.e. if the banker completely re¯nances herself by
deposit contracts.
We further conclude:
Lemma 2 Pledgeable loan repayments P are maximized if the bank chooses a capital struc-
ture given by k¤ = 0.
Proof. Because P is decreasing in k for small k and increasing in k for large k it is
su±cient to compare the maximum pledgeable loan repayments at k = 0 and at k = 1.
To simplify notations de¯ne ¼(k;L) as the renegotiation proof payment P associated with
k and L according to lemma 1. At k = 0 the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are
given by






+ (1 ¡ p)V (0);




















i.e. we have ¼(1;L) 2 (L;R) which is strictly less than R. Hence, ¼(0;L) > ¼(1;L).
Since the loan repayment P = ¼(k;L) is divided up between depositors, shareholders and






















Hence, the maximum amount of funds the banker can attract for a given capital ratio is







dk (1 + k) ¡ ¼(k;L)
(1 + k)2 S 0;
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the amount of funds a banker can raise depends on the capital ratio in a non-trivial matter:
At ¯rst, if k < ^ k, for which we have d¼(k;L)=dk < 0, it follows unambiguously dZ=dk < 0.
However, if k > ^ k we have d¼(k;L)=dk > 0 and the sign of dZ=dk is a priori not clear.
Two e®ects work in opposite directions: A risk sharing e®ect and a holdup e®ect. By the
former an increase in k increases P, i.e. the risk sharing e®ect improves the ability of the
banker to raise funds. But an increase in k also leads to a rise in the rent the banker can
extract from renegotiations with shareholders (holdup e®ect):
Lemma 3 The rent of the banker is monotonically increasing in k.



















































Since the numerator in ­ is smaller then the denominator and because k < 1, the term in
the last bracket is strictly positive. Moreover, since for k ¸ ^ k we have d¼(k;L)=dk > 0, it
follows that dQ=dk > 0 holds in the domain [0;1].
3 Bank Competition and the E®ects of Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratios
So far we have not allowed for regulatory capital requirements. To analyze the e®ects
of those regulations we have to distinguish between di®erent competitive structures in
the banking industry. At ¯rst, suppose that the banker possesses some monopoly power
vis-a-vis her borrowers. For this case, we conclude:
Proposition 4 Suppose the banker possesses monopoly power vis-a-vis her borrowers.
Since the rent the banker can extract increases monotonically in k she chooses a capital-
to-asset ratio k¤ = maxfk : ¼(k;L)=(1 + k) ¸ Ig if there is no minimum capital adequacy
ratio. In the presence of a capital adequacy requirement kreg
1. the bankers choice of k¤ is una®ected by those requirements if k¤ ¸ kreg,
2. there is disintermediation if k¤ < kreg.
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Proof. The proof follows directly from lemmata 1 through 3.
The intuition behind the ¯rst result is that a banker, who extracts the largest rent at the
expense of her contracting partners, chooses a capital-to-asset ratio k¤ that maximizes
that rent provided that it still allows her to raise funds just su±cient to ¯nance the
investment project. Further, if a regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is imposed it does either
not matter or leads to total disintermediation depending on how large the required ratio
is. Disintermediation comes into e®ect when the required ratio exceeds the maximum
capital-to-asset ratio that just allows the banker to raise su±cient funds for investment
¯nance.
Positive rents, however, attract new bankers into the marktet and banking competition
will melt down a banker's rents to zero. Since the capital-to-asset ratio k is the only
instrument variable, in a competitive equilibrium without regulatory requirements every
banker chooses k = 0, i.e. competition force them to forward the maximum pledgeable
loan repayments to their respective depositors. This competitive equlibrium, however,
is not independent from banking regulation, and imposing a minimum capital adequacy
ratio may have an impact on the banker's choice of k in a way that is not intended by the
regulator.
Proposition 5 In a competitive banking industry the banker chooses a capital-to-asset
ratio k¤ = 0 if there is no minimum capital adequacy ratio. However, in the presence of a
capital adequacy requirement kreg
1. the banker will choose k¤ = minfk : ¼(k;L)=(1 + k) ¸ I ^ k ¸ kregg if
fk : ¼(k;L)=(1 + k) ¸ I ^ k ¸ kregg 6= ?,
2. there is disintermediation otherwise.
Proof. Again, the proof follows from lemmata 1 through 3.
Part 1 of the proposition says that the banker chooses the minimum out of a set of capital-
to-asset ratios that both meet the regulatory requirement and enables her to credibly
commit to pay out ¯nanciers at least the invested amount I. This formulation includes the
case where the banker just meets the regulatory requirement if and only if ¼(kreg;L)=(1+
kreg) ¸ I. But it also includes that the banker may choose even a larger k¤ satisfying
¼(k¤;L)=(1+k¤) = I if ¼(kreg;L)=(1+kreg) < I, i.e. the actual capital-to-asset ratio is in
excess of the required minimum ratio. She will do so because satisfying the requirement
with equality leads to an insu±cient amount she can credibly commit to repay. However,
increasing her capital-to-asset ratio allows her to collect even more from her borrower and
thereby to repay at least I to the ultimate ¯nanciers. If either condition cannot be met
there will be disintermediation.
To illustrate our main results we use the following example:
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Example 1 Assume V (x) =
p
x, p = 0:7, R = 950, L = 705. Then, the shapes of the
resulting P and Z curves are given as presented in ¯gures 3 and 4 (please note the di®erent
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Figure 3: Maximum pleadeable payments of an entrepreneur
Suppose the mandatory capital requirement is k = 0:08. Then, ¯gure 4 allows to separate
three cases which di®er in the size I of the investment project the banker has to ¯nance:
² If I = 764 a monopolist banker chooses k¤ ¼ 11:2% given by the intercept of the
Z-curve and the lowest horizontal line in ¯gure 4 irrespective whether there are
regulatory capital requirements or not. Under competition, however, the banker's
chooses an k equal to the mandatory capital requirement instead of k = 0 and,
therefore, extracts some rents.
² If I = 767 a monopolist banker chooses k¤ ¼ 10:3% given by the rightmost intercept
of the Z-curve and the middle horizontal line again irrespective whether there are
regulatory capital requirements or not. Under competition, she chooses the smallest
k for which she is just able to repay I, i.e. k ¼ 8:1% which (slightly) exceeds the
regulatory requirement.
² If I = 770, the banker is not able to ful¯l the capital requirement and the project
cannot be ¯nanced because ¯nanciers are not willing to supply an amount of funds
which equals the size of the investment. In this case, minimum adequacy ratios lead
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Figure 4: Maximum pleadeable payments of a banker
4 Policy Implications
Our considerations also allow to lend some additional support for the cyclicality hypo-
thesis expressed by academics, practitioners as well as policy makers.5 According to this
hypothesis, Basel II capital standards will exacerbate business cycle °uctuations because
borrowers may be downgraded under Basel II in the course of an economic downturn. In
response, this forces a bank to hold more capital against her current loan portfolio and to
curtail her lending, thereby amplifying macroeconomic distortions.
Criticism of that procyclicality hypothesis basically rest on two arguments calling its main
assumptions into question. First, it is at least arguable whether credit risks really worsen
in the course of an economic downturn (Ayuso, P¶ erez and Saurina, 2004). Taking changes
in credit risk as a change in the probability density function associated with future credit
earnings, it is not clear cut why risk changes, and if it changes whether it actually does
so in that predicted direction. It is also conceivable, instead, that banks simply assume
high risks in a boom which then realize in the following downturn. In that sense, risk-
sensitive capital-to-asset ratios may e®ectively work anti-cyclical. Second, banks hold
capital cushions that may enable them to maintain lending even if loan portfolios become
more risky in a recession (Borio et al., 2001, Lowe, 2002).
5See, e.g., Danielsson et al. (2001), Erwin and Wilde (2001), Estrella (2004), Gordy and Howells
(2004), Kashyap and Stein (2004) and PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004).
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The argument made in this paper, however, implies that the existence of a positive capital
cushion might not be su±cient to prevent pro-cyclicality in bank lending even if risk-
weighted capital-to-asset ratios remain unchanged in the course of a business cycle. The
reason is that banks need their capital bu®ers to raise su±cient funds from investors.
Therefore, the Basel regulatory frameworks may have consequences for macroeconomic
stability and makes it more di±cult for policy makers to prevent deep recessions. This
even holds for the existing regulatory framework and explains why a pro-cyclicality in
capital cushions can already be detected in existing data (Ayuso, P¶ erez, Saurina, 2004).
To ¯gure out the responses of capital holdings to business cycles, we ask what happens to a
banker's maximum pledgeable payments Z if the liquidation value L falls, a phenomenon
that is typically related to economic downturns. Since a fall of L weakens a banker's
bargaining position vis-¶ a-vis her borrower, the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to
renegotiations P decreases, i.e. the entrepreneur's maximum pledgeable payments fall.
This leads to a decrease in Z, i.e. the amount a banker can credibly commit to pay
to her investors. When the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is binding, a banker can (if
at all) re-strengthen her bargaining position vis-¶ a-vis her borrower only by choosing an
even higher capital-to-asset ratio because this makes her less reluctant to engage in risky
renegotiations. As a result, there will be either disintermediation or an increase in the
capital cushion.
These considerations yield in:
Proposition 6 In a competitive banking industry and in the presence of a capital adequacy
requirement, a decrease in the liquidation value of assets to ¹ L < L results in
1. an unchanged capital-to-asset ratio
k¤¤(= k¤ = kreg)if¼(kreg; ¹ L)=(1 + kreg) ¸ I;
2. an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio
k¤¤ = min
©




k : ¼(k; ¹ L)=(1 + k) ¸ I ^ k ¸ kregª
6= ?,
3. disintermediation otherwise.
Proof. Note that dZ=dL =
d¼(k;L)=dL
1+k . An equivalent condition for the results in the
proposition is therefore to show that d¼(k;L)=dL > 0 for high k and d¼(k;L)=dL = 0 for
low k.
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1. First, suppose that k is large so that 1
2(L ¡ 1¡k
1+kP) ¸ 0 holds (see lemma 1). Then,


















































































2. Second, consider k < ¹ k where ¹ P = ¼(¹ k; ¹ L) satis¯es
¹ L ¡
1 ¡ ¹ k
1 + ¹ k
¹ P = 0:
(Note that ¹ k > ^ k for ¹ L < L, where ^ k is de¯ned as in lemma 1.) In that case we
obviously have dP=dL = 0 since the lottery the banker faces if k is low does not
depend on L.
This result can be further cleari¯ed by means of our previous example.
Example 2 (cont.) Suppose that collateral damages such that L decreases to 700. Then,
¯gure 5 illustrates the e®ects of capital requirements for a competitive banking industry.
² If I = 764 the banker's chooses an k¤ = 8:5 which is higher than in the benchmark
case.
² If I = 767 the banker cannot provide funds because of binding capital requirements
even though she could for L = 705.
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Figure 5: E®ects of a collateral damage.
5 Summary
This paper o®ers an explanation for why banks hold capital-to-asset ratios in excess of
regulatory minimum requirements. We argue that a banker's bargaining position vis-µ a-vis
borrowers depends on her capital structure if renegotiations causes risky bargaining costs.
In consequence, both the banker's maximum enforceable loan repayments as well as the
maximum pledgeable payments to her ¯nanciers depend on the chosen capital structure.
The main results of our analysis are as follows: If the bank possesses some monopoly power
she will choose an equity ratio that maximizes her rents given that the project can just be
¯nanced. This choice is una®ected by regulatory standards as long as these standards are
not too strong which leads to disintermediation. Under competition, however, a banker
chooses k = 0 and forwards maximum pledgable loan repayments to her depositors as long
as there are no minimum adequacy ratios. If, on the other hand, regulators have chosen
mandatory capital adequacy ratio above a certain level, bankers are either forced to hold
an even higher capital ratio or to drop out of the market.
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